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The emancipation of women was one of the biggest changes transforming post-war 
West German society after 1945, and indeed Germany throughout the whole of the 
twentieth century. The change in gender relations was a long, uneven process that 
included setbacks and several dynamic thrusts of acceleration. In this, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was no different from many other highly industrialized 
societies. Still, much of the historiography on post-war Germany has failed to address 
the issue adequately, and to weave the political actions of women and the rise of 
female emancipation into its master narratives. This essay addresses the reasons for 
this failure, but also the implications of its reversal. It aims to show that the addition 
of feminism to West German history necessarily changes the agents driving the 
development, but also the definition of “success” in the teleological Westernization 
narrative of the Federal Republic. The first part of the article engages critically with 
the omission of female agency in the scholarship on post-war Germany. The second 
part focuses on a concrete example, based on original research: the role of women 
activists during West Germany’s “1968.” It serves as a showcase for the wide-ranging 
implications of the inclusion of feminist agency. The master narratives of the West 
German Sixties, but also of post-war West German history in general, emerge as in 
need of rewriting.* 
 Not coincidentally, all historians who have tackled the grueling task of writing 
large-scale national histories of post-1945 Germany (in German) have so far been 
men. Speculating on the reasons for this, Ute Frevert has emphasized the underlying 
quest for honor and fame within the German profession. Naming Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 
Thomas Nipperdey, Heinrich August Winkler and other colleagues, Frevert sees “a 
specific form of male authorship” at work where historiography becomes a 
performative contest among males who compete for power, honor and political 
impact. Frevert compares the authors to long-distance runners who try to outdo each 
other with single-authored volumes of a thousand pages or more. Like generals, they 
see “history as a battlefield on which troops are deployed against each other ... and 
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where one thinks in terms of victory and defeat.”1 The extent to which the German 
historical profession was and is dominated by men was also highlighted by the Oxford 
historian Lyndal Roper in a keynote address for the 2014 Historikertag. Roper took 
her German colleagues to task for failing to integrate gender perspectives into 
mainstream scholarship, and contrasted the situation unfavorably with the Anglo-
American setting. Her diagnosis was of a “hidden gender hierarchy [verborgene 
Genderhierarchie]” in the field, stressing that the underrepresentation of female 
tenured professors (4 per cent in 1992, 12.6 per cent in 2002) was particularly acute in 
the fields of modern and contemporary history.2 Indeed, this pattern reaches back 
decades. Ever since the first female history professors entered academia in Germany, 
they had disproportionately been hired in specialized subfields such as ancient 
history, medieval, Eastern European and non-European history – “not in modern and 
contemporary history which is particularly important for the production of national 
‘master narratives’.”3  
A male perspective shapes the “master surveys,” or “Meistererzählungen” of 
modern German history, and mostly unintentionally so. To a large extent, existing 
studies on women’s and gender history have not been incorporated into the weighty 
surveys of national history. To a lesser extent, the authors also bypass scholarship on 
areas often still seen as “feminized” – such as the history of family and kinship, 
private lives and emotions, sexuality and the body, or household economies. Where a 
political history approach is followed, “politics” is often still understood in the 
narrower sense, as relating to the state, its institutions, and the public sphere. Where a 
structural history approach rules, the “general” structures deemed worthy of attention 
largely exclude gender, women’s and family issues because these are seen as 
“particular” and less relevant.4 Therefore, gender relations, masculinity and 
                                                
1 Ute Frevert, “’I have often wondered at the person’s courage’ oder: Mut und Ehre der 
Meistererzähler,” paper delivered at Bielefeld University, 11 September 2015. I thank Ute Frevert and 
Lyndal Roper for copies of their unpublished papers. 
2 Lyndal Roper, “Frauen in der Geschichtswissenschaft 1982-2012,” Festvortrag at 50th Deutscher 
Historikertag, Göttingen 25 September 2014. The numbers above omit untenured junior and visiting 
professorships. If these are included, the number rises to 27 per cent in 2012: Karen Hagemann, 
“Gleichberechtigt? Frauen in der bundesdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft,” in: Zeithistorische 
Forschungen 13 (2016), 108-135, here 134. 
3 Ibid., 118. 
4 See Karin Hausen, „Die Nicht-Einheit der Geschichte als historiographische Herausforderung: Zur 
historischen Relevanz und Anstößigkeit der Geschlechtergeschichte,” in Geschlechtergeschichte und 
Allgemeine Geschichte: Herausforderungen und Perspektiven, ed. Hans Medick and Anne-Charlott 
Trepp (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998), 28-32, 45; Thomas Kühne, “Staatspolitik, Frauenpolitik, 
Männerpolitik: Politikgeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte,” in ibid., 171-231; Robert G. Moeller, 
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femininity, the private realm and subjectivities play only a marginal role in these 
much-cited tomes, and rarely inform the general narrative arc and the telos of the 
Federal Republic’s development. A look at the most recent master surveys shows, for 
example, only minimal involvement with the history of the second wave of the 
women’s movement.  
Typically, the authors wholeheartedly acknowledge that a sea change took place 
but thereafter avoid in-depth discussion of it. They applaud the positive impact of the 
feminist movement while isolating it from the general narrative. Hans-Ulrich Wehler 
lauds the “undeniably successful track record” and the “secular triumphal procession 
[Siegeszug] of female emancipation” as “one of the biggest social changes of the 
epoch since 1945” but only allocates it eight of 439 pages.5 Ulrich Herbert likewise 
asserts that “the women’s movement was doubtless the most important” of all social 
movements of the time – using the same wording for both the West German and the 
American context – while compressing its treatment into less than one page in a 1451-
page book.6 Heinrich August Winkler devotes only one sentence to the topic in his 
survey. In Eckart Conze’s history of the Federal Republic, a mere three out of 936 
pages are devoted to the feminist wave – although Conze’s red thread, the search for 
security and stability, could fruitfully have been applied to fears of emasculation and 
attempts to stabilize traditional gender relations. In his thirty-page chapter on the 
protests of the late 60s, female actors are absent while much is made of “1968” as 
conflict between sons and fathers.7 The women’s movement occupies a similar niche 
in Konrad Jarausch’s history of Europe, where it is treated in one paragraph.8 And 
while Edgar Wolfrum’s survey pays some attention to women’s experiences, feminist 
activism plays no role in the way the history of “1968” and the social movements of 
the 1970s are interpreted. The quotations and illustrations foreground male 
                                                                                                                                      
“The Elephant in the Living Room: Or Why the History of Twentieth-Century Germany Should Be a 
Family Affair,” in Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography, ed. Karen 
Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 228-49. 
5 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 5: Bundesrepublik und DDR, 1949-1990 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 172, 184. 
6 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 844, 861, 
921-22. 
7 Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, vol. 2: Deutsche Geschichte vom Dritten 
Reich bis zur Wiedervereinigung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), 352. Eckart Conze, Die Suche nach 
Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: Siedler, 2009), 403-05, see also 
355; 331-360, especially 337. Hannah Arendt is briefy cited, 332. 
8 Konrad H. Jarausch, Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 604, cf. 589-90. 
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protagonists.9 Axel Schildt’s 1999 history Ankunft im Westen discusses women’s 
participation in the labour market but not the feminist movement. Though he devotes 
two sentences to the fact that many “68ers” were female, this does not affect his 
perspective on the protests.10 In none of these cases are feminism or male dominance 
part of the overarching narrative. 
Why do these surveys neglect the second women’s movement to this extent, 
bypassing a growing body of historiography on women and gender in postwar 
Germany? Scholarly studies on feminist activism in West Germany,11 and even more 
so on gender relations after 1945,12 are readily available. In addition, a plenitude of 
primary sources informs us about contemporary women’s political actions (in stark 
contrast to earlier periods of history which nevertheless have seen a more productive 
inclusion of gender in the scholarship13). There are two reasons the dominant master 
narratives insufficiently integrate the existing literature on women and gender: first, 
institutional marginalisation, and second, the gendered implications of conceptual 
frameworks such as “the West” and “political history.” 
 In German academia, women’s and gender history is still seen as a niche, rather 
than as essential component of historical scholarship. As recently as 2004, the 
German Historikertag conference was held without a single panel on women’s or 
gender history, all such session proposals having been rejected. In marked contrast, at 
the 2004 annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D.C., 
                                                
9 Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 261-71, 405-06. 
10 Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Fischer, 1999), 57-59, 187. 
11 See Kristina Schulz, Der lange Atem der Provokation: Die Frauenbewegung in der Bundesrepublik und in 
Frankreich 1968-1976 (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2002); Myra Marx Ferree, Varieties of Feminism: 
German Gender Politics in Global Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Christine 
Thon, Frauenbewegung im Wandel der Generationen (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015); Ilse Lenz, ed., Die 
neue Frauenbewegung in Deutschland: Abschied vom kleinen Unterschied: Eine Quellensammlung 
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2nd ed. 2010). 
12 By no means a comprehensive list: Julia Paulus, Eva-Maria Silies and Kerstin Wolff, ed., 
Zeitgeschichte als Geschlechtergeschichte: Neue Perspektiven auf die Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Campus, 2012); Eva-Maria Silies, Liebe, Lust und Last: Die Pille als weibliche Generationserfahrung 
in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1980 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010); Christine von Oertzen, The Pleasure of 
a Surplus Income: Part-Time Work, Gender Politics, and Social Change in West Germany 1955-1969 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2007); Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women 
and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); 
Sybille Buske, Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard: Eine Geschichte der Unehelichkeit in Deutschland 
1900 bis 1970 (Wallstein Verlag, 2013); Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the 
Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); 
Theresia Degener, “Der Streit um Gleichheit und Differenz in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 
1945,” in Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts, ed. Ute Gerhard (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 871-99. 
13 See for example the historiography on early modern European witchcraft, or on gender relations 
during the French revolution. 
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about a quarter of the panels in Central European and German history dealt with 
women or gender issues.14 Within Germany, contributions on women and/or gender in 
postwar German history are still overwhelmingly written by female authors, most of 
whom have not (or not yet) acquired one of the full professorships at German 
universities. Many of these authors belong to neighbouring disciplines, end up 
working outside Germany or are employed on short-term contracts and fill the lower 
ranks of the profession. Nowadays, there are only nine full history professorships 
fully or partly dedicated to gender history or women’s history in Germany. These 
types of positions were mostly created during the 1980s and 1990s, not least in 
response to undergraduate and postgraduate students who vocally demanded them, 
and are currently under threat: When the incumbents retire, the professorships are 
often cut or redefined. A recent study on the role of women and gender-themed 
professorships in Germany points out that these positions were closely linked to and 
often crucial for gender scholarship outside academia – in the form of feminist 
museums, archives, libraries, centers, journals and projects. At the same time, they 
faced a practice of “marginalizing integration” within academia, where gender topics 
were repeatedly placed at the margins of the field and the associated researchers were 
labelled both “special” and “inferior” in internal power dynamics.15 This situation is 
both a reason for and a symptom of the isolation and compartmentalization of 
women’s and gender history in the field.  
Another, deeper reason for the marginalization of feminist agency in 
historiography lies in the over-reliance on an idealized model of the West. When the 
narrative telos of Western liberalism is read into the history of West Germany, 
historians carry with them the baggage of this concept. In the introduction to the 
present special issue, Astrid M. Eckert and Frank Biess highlight the inherent 
exclusions of the “Westernization” and “liberalization” approach, stressing in 
particular the legacy of Western colonial violence and slavery. But they also mention 
the model’s emphasis on “a Western (often explicitly or implicitly male) rational 
                                                
14 Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert, “Gendering Modern German History: Comparing 
Historiographies and Academic Cultures in Germany and the United States through the Lens of 
Gender,“ in Gendering Modern German History, 28-30. 
15 39 incumbents were interviewed for a study on the role of these gender-themed professorships; 23 of 
these positions were since cut and additional ones rededicated to other areas. Ulla Bock, Pionierarbeit: 
Die ersten Professorinnen für Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung an deutschsprachigen Hochschulen 
1984-2014 (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2015). 
 6 
enlightenment subject as the main agent in the process of democratization.”16 In fact, 
beyond the working classes, women were the biggest group excluded by the Western 
project of liberalism and progress, from the emergence of early liberalism during the 
eighteenth century to the struggle for women’s suffrage in the early twentieth century. 
Therefore, the Western master narrative is inherently male in several respects. It 
originally assigned rationality to men and irrationality to women, agency to men and 
passivity to women. In the normative orbit of the West, a conscious effort is needed to 
imagine women driving progress. Where master narratives privilege ‘political’ issues 
in the traditional sense, they tend to reproduce a male cast of actors and strictly 
gendered forms of political action.17 The concept of the West is therefore structurally 
underpinned by the foundations of patriarchy, even if this is rarely addressed openly. 
If gender inequality is to be truly included in the Federal Republic’s master 
narratives, new questions arise about the country’s post-war “success story,” the 
agents of change, caesuras and periodization. The starting point is to acknowledge 
that liberal Western democracy, as the norm that the Federal Republic has typically 
been measured against, was built on male dominance, and that there has been, to this 
day, a longstanding struggle against the continuing suppression and exclusion of 
women from the full promises of democracy and equality. Therefore, whenever 
historians emplot narratives of “liberalization,” “democratization” or 
“Westernization,” they need to integrate the overcoming of patriarchal structures, 
discourses, subjectivities and embodiments into their argument. They could ask to 
what extent post-1945 developments were a success story for women as well as for 
men. In how far did West German state and society retain patriarchal structures, 
thereby guaranteeing that husbands dominated wives? Which institutions, such as 
marriage and division of labor, or cultural dichotomies, such as productive versus 
reproductive work or public versus private spheres, reinforced gender inequality?18 
How and when did they change over time, and which limitations remained? Which 
groups challenged the patriarchal consensus and should therefore be credited with 
                                                
16 Introduction to this special issue, 20, see also 12-13, 26. 
17 See Kühne, “Staatspolitik,” and the call for a reconfiguration of the metanarrative of Western 
modernity in: Lynn Hunt, “The Challenge of Gender: Deconstruction of Categories and Reconstruction 
of Narratives in Gender History,” in Geschlechtergeschichte und Allgemeine Geschichte, ed. Medick 
and Trepp, 15-56.  
18 I use the term patriarchy to describe societies structured by male dominance, even though in the 
modern era, this dominance is less defined by fatherhood than by other factors. See Claudia Opitz, Um-
Ordnungen der Geschlechter: Einführung in die Geschlechtergeschichte (Tübingen: diskord, 2005), 
18-25. 
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driving progress? Which opposing groups defended the status quo, why, and how 
successfully? Lastly, the answers to these questions impact the grand narrative of the 
post-war era by affecting the periodization of post-Second World War history, with its 
current emphasis on the emergence of postmodernity and a new era “after the boom” 
beginning in the 1970s. 
 In the following pages, I present a case study on women activists in the West 
German protests of the late 1960s – activism that to date has largely been overlooked 
in mainstream historiography (though there are specialist publications). The female 
“1968,” which includes the first stirrings of the second wave of the feminist 
movement, has generally been cast as a marginal by-product of the student revolt. 
Women’s activism has been treated in isolation from the predominantly male “1968,” 
if it has been treated at all. Histories of the West German Sixties habitually display 
images of men on the book covers: Rudi Dutschke, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Fritz Teufel 
and Rainer Langhans have become the icons of the rebellion.19 In the public 
imaginary, mention of “1968” conjures up images of SDS debates in overcrowded 
lecture halls and student demonstrations, invariably with men at the microphones and 
marching in the first row. In most accounts, female “68ers” function mainly as the 
rebels’ arm candy – attachments who brewed the coffee, sewed the flags and typed 
the leaflets for their male comrades.20 Feminists such as Helke Sander, Sigrid Damm-
Rüger, Silvia Bovenschen or Florence Hervé have been all but forgotten. In the 
aforementioned master surveys, their names do not appear in the index, while Rudi 
Dutschke or Daniel Cohn-Bendit regularly do. These women are not even referenced 
in books more narrowly dedicated to the German Sixties.21  
                                                
19 See the covers of, for example: Wolfgang Kraushaar, Achtundsechzig: Eine Bilanz (Berlin: 
Propyläen, 2008); Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Rüdiger Dammann, 1968: Die Revolte (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Fischer, 2007); Norbert Frei, 1968: Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest (Munich: DTV, 2008); Martin 
Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 
Sixties (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2009). 
20 Former activists report that they were addressed as “brides of the revolution” (Susanne Schunter-
Kleemann), “accessories” (Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz) and as “the comrade’s extended arm” 
(Annemarie Tröger). Qtd. in Ute Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen: Porträt einer rebellischen 
Frauengeneration (Berlin: Ulrike Helmer, 2008), 111; Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz, Wir hatten ein 
barbarisches, schönes Leben: Rudi Dutschke: Eine Biographie (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1996), 
81; Siegward Lönnendonker, ed., Linksintellektueller Aufbruch zwischen “Kulturrevolution” und 
“kultureller Zerstörung”: Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS) in der 
Nachkriegsgeschichte 1946-1969 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 1998), 216. 
21 They are not listed in the index of Winkler, Wolfrum, Herbert, Wehler and Conze (see footnotes 5 to 
9), and neither in Frei, 1968, or Götz Aly’s Unser Kampf: 1968 - ein irritierter Blick zurück (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Fischer, 2008). 
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A closer look will show that this gendered narrative of Sixties protest, to which 
we have become accustomed, is far from accurate. Ever since 1968, discourses on the 
revolt in the West German public have been fixated on male protagonists. Gendered 
myths developed around a male-defined “political generation” of “68ers,” and around 
the supposed conflicts between Nazi fathers and antifascist sons. Thus, politically 
active women disappeared from the history of the Sixties. In fact, female “68ers” 
existed. Moreover, their long-term impact on the development of West German 
society was arguably larger than that of their male compatriots. Once we write women 
back into the story, the character of “1968,” its role as a caesura of post-war German 
history, and the concept of the “‘68er generation” need to be reevaluated.  
The story of feminist activism in the late 1960s has been researched and thus only 
needs a brief recap.22 It started at the universities with the most politicized women in 
the Socialist German Student League (SDS). About a quarter of students in 1968, and 
also a quarter of SDS members were female.23 Female students experienced routine 
everyday discrimination at the university, often without being aware of it. Two to 
three times as many female than male students dropped out before the final exams. 
Eight out of ten professors were convinced that women attended university only to 
find a husband, a Bonn flyer claimed in 1969. Indeed, as late as 1960 a representative 
study of West German university professors had found 64 per cent of them principally 
or mostly opposed to women students, and 79 per cent to women professors.24 As 
West German women still tended to marry and have their first child by their early to 
mid-twenties, an ill-timed pregnancy often spelt the end of a female student’s 
academic career. Childcare facilities for under-threes were non-existent, for over-
threes scarce, and only one in five young fathers helped out with childcare tasks.25  
                                                
22 More in: Christina von Hodenberg, Das andere Achtundsechzig: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer 
Revolte (Munich: Beck, 2018), ch. 5; Ute Kätzel, “Vorwort,” in Die 68erinnen, 9-18; Schulz, Der 
lange Atem der Provokation; Elisabeth Zellmer, Töchter der Revolte? Frauenbewegung und 
Feminismus der 1970er Jahre in München (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011). 
23 Florence Hervé, Studentinnen in der BRD: Eine soziologische Untersuchung (Köln: Pahl-
Rugenstein, 1973), p. 20; Hagemann, “Gleichberechtigt?,” 115; Andrea Wienhaus, Bildungswege zu 
“1968”: Eine Kollektivbiografie des Sozialistischen Deutschen Studentenbundes (Bielefeld: transcript, 
2014), 102 (for the SDS West Berlin). 
24 Hervé, Studentinnen, 82-83; leaflet of Bonn feminist group Arbeitskreis Emanzipation, October 
1969, in: University Archive Bonn, Kl. Slg. 331, “Dokumentation arbeitskreis emanzipation.” 
Hagemann, “Gleichberechtigt?,” 116-17. 
25 Elisabeth Pfeil, Die 23jährigen: Eine Generationenuntersuchung am Geburtenjahrgang 1941 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1968), 84-88; Sven Reichardt, Authentizität und Gemeinschaft: 
Linksalternatives Leben in den Siebziger und frühen Achtziger Jahren (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 722-
45; Hervé, Studentinnen, 76-85. 
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The earliest protests by female “‘68ers” grew out of the dissatisfaction with this 
situation. Disproportionately, it was mothers of small children who began to organize 
themselves and voice their concerns, such as Helke Sander, Sarah Haffner, Frigga 
Haug and Karin Adrian in West Berlin or Florence Hervé in Bonn.26 Significantly, 
many female activists had a transnational background and experience with countries 
in which childcare was more readily available and career women were seen more 
favorably than in West Germany. Sander compared the situation with Finland, 
Haffner with Britain, Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz with the United States and Hervé with 
France.27 Now, women gathered in informal reading groups (in West Berlin and Bonn 
since 1967, in Frankfurt since 1968) or women’s communes (in Munich since 1968). 
Over time, these became organized interest groups such as the Berlin “Aktionsrat zur 
Befreiung der Frauen,” the Frankfurt “Weiberrat” and the Bonn “Arbeitskreis 
Emanzipation.” They wrote and circulated leaflets, initially aimed mainly at fellow 
female students. Many of these flyers called the machos of the New Left to task for 
their patronizing attitude towards the women who wanted to be part of political 
discussion and action.28 A common complaint was that the men talked over the 
women’s heads: “All the time there were intimidating remarks” (Elsa Rassbach), “the 
men often laughed” at women speaking (Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz), the SDS 
cultivated “repressive structures of communication” (Mona Steffen). From Cologne 
university, Beatrix Novy reported “this ubiquitous gap: the [male] comrades always 
talked very loud and very much, and the women very little.”29 The women’s response 
was to opt for gender separatism and to organize themselves in female-only groups. 
The unease at the patriarchal demeanor of the male activists did not stop there. 
The Frankfurt Weiberrat famously mocked their male comrades for their sexual 
conquests with a leaflet titled “Befreit die sozialistischen Eminenzen von ihren 
bürgerlichen Schwänzen” (Liberate the socialist bigwigs from their bourgeois cocks). 
In this much-cited but rare example, female “68ers” explicitly linked the sexism of 
SDS men to the pressures many women felt to comply with the demands of a male-
                                                
26 Hodenberg, Das andere Achtundsechzig, 116-20. 
27 See Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 163-64, 282; author’s interview with Florence Hervé on 18 May 
2017. 
28 Lenz, Die neue Frauenbewegung, 50-59; University Archive Bonn, Kl. Slg. 331, „Dokumentation 
arbeitskreis emanzipation“; Zellmer, Töchter der Revolte?, 82-88. 
29 Rassbach and Dutschke-Klotz qtd. in Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 65-66, 281; Steffen on 24 
November 1968 qtd. in Schulz, Der lange Atem der Provokation, 88; Novy qtd. in documentary, 
“Meine Geschichte – die 68er Generation,” dir. Carsten Günther, broadcast on Phoenix 21 September 
2008. 
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dominated sexual revolution.30 Much more commonly, though, women activists 
protested not the men’s sexual practices but their avoidance of family work and 
household chores. Even in the experimental hothouse of Berlin’s Commune 1, female 
members complained about patriarchally flavored everyday interactions. In Dagmar 
Seehuber’s words: “The patriarchal structure of society expressed itself particularly 
strongly in this commune ... That’s because the men categorically denied that they 
themselves had to change. They had the theoretical blueprint but their actions were far 
from it.”31 From other communes, Karin Adrian reported tense weekly meetings with 
“the main issue being that once again nobody had done the cleaning,” and Hedda 
Kuschel “noticed how often the men ducked household chores” in the Wieland 
commune.32 Helke Sander who lived in a ten-room shared flat in West Berlin with her 
son, experienced incessant conflicts over mundane duties because “the idea of 
cleaning a toilet by themselves was unfathomable” to the men. This eventually led to 
the women locking the men into a room for a night until they promised to share the 
work better.33  
A key text read by many feminists at the time was Karin Schrader-Klebert’s essay 
“The cultural revolution of woman” in the June 1969 Kursbuch, which interpreted 
woman’s role in the household as slavery and disenfranchisement. Household duties 
were now theoretically conceived of as instruments of the repression and intellectual 
stultification of women, as a ritual of daily humiliation and “material cult for the man 
[Kult der Dinge für den Mann].”34 A flyer of a Berlin women’s center stated: “We 
only achieved recognition where we are most constricted: in the household and 
family. Where we are locked into the two-to-three bedroom apartment in order 
constantly to polish it.”35 
The first event of the second feminist movement covered by several print media 
was a clash between men and women at a September 1968 SDS conference in 
                                                
30 Flyer from November 1968 in Lenz, Die neue Frauenbewegung, 64-65. 
31 Dagmar Przytulla, nee Seehuber, qtd. in Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 218. 
32 Qtd. ibid., 246, 130. 
33 Sander qtd. in Der Spiegel, April 7, 2018, 47. 
34 Karin Schrader-Klebert, “Die kulturelle Revolution der Frau,” Kursbuch 17 (1969), 1-46, here 10, 
28-29. 
35 1975 flyer qtd. in Reichardt, Authentizität und Gemeinschaft, 606. A similar flyer from 1971 in: 
Universitätsarchiv Bonn, Kl.Slg. 331, Dokumentation “arbeitskreis emanzipation.” By 1976, unpaid 
domestic work became a major topic for the German feminist movement: Gisela Bock and Barbara 
Duden, „Arbeit aus Liebe - Liebe als Arbeit: Zur Entstehung der Hausarbeit im Kapitalismus,“ in 
Frauen und Wissenschaft: Beiträge zur 1. Sommeruniversität für Frauen, ed. Gruppe Berliner 
Dozentinnen (Berlin, 1977), 118–99. 
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Frankfurt, when Helke Sander delivered a brave speech attacking male students for 
taking part in “the social oppression of women in an individual way …, in the private 
sphere.” Fellow SDS member Sigrid Damm-Rüger then threw tomatoes at the male 
delegates, who attempted to avoid any discussion of Sander’s theses. Konkret 
columnist Ulrike Meinhof, herself a mother of twins trying to reconcile a journalistic 
career with family obligations, declared these tomatoes the harbinger of things to 
come: “The woman who threw tomatoes, and the woman who supplied the reasons 
for doing so … acted for countless women .... And they couldn’t have cared less if 
what they had to say measured up to the usual theoretical level of discourse expected 
in the SDS ... The Berlin women who intervened in Frankfurt no longer want to 
cooperate. They bear the entire burden of raising children ... They no longer want to 
suffer insulting comments for not having a good education, or only a partial 
education, or not being able to work in their professions because they are raising 
children.”36  
One of the first decisions taken by the new women’s groups in 1968 was to initiate self-
governed Kinderläden. These new nurseries were meant to free up time for the mothers to study 
and be politically active, but also to champion a less authoritarian style of education. The model 
quickly spread across the country, with Kinderläden mushrooming everywhere. But during the 
first years of the new nurseries, leftist women and men fought over their control. The West 
Berlin “Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen” was challenged by a new “Zentralrat der 
sozialistischen Kinderläden” set up by young fathers who prioritized not the liberating effect of 
childcare on the mothers but rather the ideological experiment of raising a new generation of 
revolutionaries. The men wanted the children to be freed from the constraints of capitalism and 
bourgeois family values, and this theoretical zest made the nurseries “into a political project 
which demanded full-time commitment” instead of saving the women time (according to Helke 
Sander).37 This gendered battle over Kinderläden mirrored a fundamental conflict within the 
New Left over revolutionary priorities: Most male rebels saw the plight of women as a 
Nebenwiderspruch (minor contradiction) which would automatically be resolved once the 
                                                
36 Ulrike Meinhof, “Die Frauen im SDS oder In eigener Sache,” konkret 12 (1968), translated in: U.M., 
Everybody Talks About the Weather. We Don’t: The Writings of Ulrike Meinhof, ed. Karin Bauer (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2008), 209-11. 
37 Qtd. in Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, p. 168. For Kinderläden, see Till van Rahden, “Eine Welt ohne 
Familie: Der Kinderladen als ein demokratisches Heilsversprechen,” in Autorität: Krise, Konstruktion 
und Konjunktur, ed. Till van Rahden, Oliver Kohns and Martin Roussel (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 
2016), 255-82; Reichardt, Authentizität und Gemeinschaft, 728-81; Zellmer, Töchter der Revolte?, 68-
78. 
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Hauptwiderspruch (major contradiction) had been eradicated, i.e. the campaign against 
capitalism had been won.38 This was by no means the only internal battle in which female 
activists found themselves. From 1969 onwards, several painful splits developed within the 
feminist movement: between communist, socialist and reformist women, and between those 
who stressed biological gender difference and their adversaries.39 
The politically active women of 1968 had gone through SDS schooling, and thus 
employed symbolic direct actions to attract media coverage. Remarkably, their 
actions often drew on elements from the female spheres of household and caring 
duties. Damm-Rüger threw tomatoes for a soup she was planning to make for supper. 
Annette Schwarzenau besmirched the walls of the editorial offices of the illustrated 
weekly Stern with the contents of soiled Kinderladen diapers and helped nurses 
protest against the bonnets they were ordered to cover their hair with. A group around 
Helke Sander in West Berlin incited Kindergarten teachers to strike. The West Berlin 
Commune 99 initiated a “children’s demonstration” with balloons and Punch and 
Judy theatre.40 
But while public actions by female “‘68ers” were often playful and creative, their 
private struggles could be painfully mundane and repetitive. Women’s demands for a 
rapid change in everyday gendered habits were bound to meet with resistance by their 
partners, because most men of the “‘68er” generation had grown up with a sense of 
entitlement. In three quarters of all families with multiple children born around 1940, 
boys had to help much less in the house than girls. This was a male privilege that 
almost all the boys but only half the girls perceived to be “natural.”41 In this age 
cohort, gendered battles over cleaning, grocery shopping and childcare were now 
fought out well beyond the walls of communes. While a survey from 1964 reported 
that young women did nine tenths or more of all household chores in 93 percent of all 
cases,42 the nagging by women (and cooperation by men) began slowly to change the 
situation over the course of the next decades. 
                                                
38 For examples, see Lönnendonker, ed., Linksintellektueller Aufbruch, 209, 214, 231. 
39 See Frigga Haug in Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 192-93; Schulz, Der lange Atem der Provokation, 93-
96, 149-50; Rosemarie Nave-Herz, Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Deutschland (Opladen: 
Leske and Budrich, 1982), 56-58. 
40 Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 48-49, 51-54, 171-72; Der Spiegel, June 9, 1969, 85. 
41 Pfeil, Die 23jährigen, 82. West German girls of these age cohorts often felt their brothers were 
treated preferentially: Lu Seegers, Vati blieb im Krieg: Vaterlosigkeit als generationelle Erfahrung im 
20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013), 196.  
42 Pfeil, Die 23jährigen, 83-84. 
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The private activism of female “‘68ers” challenged their partners and husbands. 
This campaign in the home, together with a certain disdain for the bourgeois 
institution of monogamy and the limited availability of state-sponsored child care, 
resulted in many relationships tail-spinning into crisis. A contemporary sociologist 
spoke of the common “experiences of failure” and the “high psychological costs” paid 
by “all those involved in the feminist movement.”43 In the urban alternative milieus of 
the 1970s, where feminism had made significant inroads, heterosexual relationships 
were typically referred to as “Beziehungskisten” (meaning relationships under 
construction). They were experienced as besieged by all kinds of problems, and 
variously characterized as “relationship prisons,” “daily petty wars” and “crisis 
carousels.”44 Many “68ers” of both genders rejected the institution of marriage not 
just for its bourgeois flavor, but also because it was a pillar of patriarchy. A 1969 
report about the Berlin Kinderladen founded by Commune 2 stated: “Without 
exception, all nuclear families involved in the Kinderladen project experienced strong 
tensions between the married partners from the outset. During our cooperation in the 
Kinderladen, actually, everyone realized that these marriages were unsustainable.”45 
A peek into one marriage shows why.   
 Regine Walter-Lehmann was an activist in the West Berlin feminist 
movement of the 1970s and later became an editor of tageszeitung. As a student, she 
had married Joachim Lehmann; both were active in the New Left. While in the 
beginning of their relationship, she had typed her husband’s final thesis, she soon saw 
in him “the sluggish object of a re-education offensive concerning children, kitchen 
and cleaning duties” and subjected him (in his words) to “disputes at the kitchen table, 
lasting into the early morning hours, about female and male patterns of perception, 
thought and writing,” disputes “which could never be resolved.” After the birth of a 
daughter, Joachim had urged Regine to quit an intellectually exciting, but poorly paid 
job as assistant dramaturg at a theatre. Regine complied, but now experienced the 
family flat as a “prison” and wrote in her diary: “I will never forgive myself for 
giving up such a coveted job which I loved so dearly. It eats and eats away at me … 
Instead I played at wife gone wild and got myself into an extramarital affair. Typical, 
                                                
43 Nave-Herz, Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung, 80. 
44 [„Beziehungsknast“, „Krisenkarussell“, „täglicher Kleinkrieg“]: Sven Reichardt, “Von 
‘Beziehungskisten’ und ‘offener Sexualität,’” in Das alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil 
und linke Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968-1983, ed. S.R. and Detlef 
Siegfried (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 267-89, here 267-68, 280. 
45 Kommune 2, “Kindererziehung in der Kommune,” Kursbuch 17, June 1969, 147-78, here 174. 
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unfortunately. And bloody stupid, too.” Although she loved her husband, she simply 
could not overcome her opposition to “this Klein-Family-Life … it makes me sick … 
Daughter gets to the heart of it: she formulates her wishes in a provocatively 
conservative way. Mommy, Daddy, Child, all together! Of course, she senses my 
tendency to abscond and is aggressive and anxious. If that continues for a few years, I 
won’t exist any longer. I have to do something new, something different!” To break 
out of “this old-fashioned wifely perspective” which she “had never wanted,” Regine 
eventually moved out of the family flat, took up a new job and became a “three-day 
mum” to her daughter for several years. While Regine noted how “wretched” she felt 
to tell her daughter that she “would share the fate of her many comrades in the 
Schülerladen who have a four-day mum and a three-day dad,” she did not see an 
alternative. In the milieu the Lehmanns belonged to, their separation was by no means 
unusual. In the Kinderladen her daughter had attended, only two children were raised 
by parents who lived together.46 
Walter-Lehmann’s actions were a protest against the traditional gender norms she 
felt confined by. Emancipatory battles like hers played out in the private realm and 
thus were less visible in the public sphere. Whilst the new feminist movement 
enriched politics by making the private political, the far-reaching impact of women’s 
private struggles remained consistently under-represented in contemporary debates. 
There was a deep-seated expectation that revolutions could only take place in public, 
and that revolutionaries could only be male. The police, for example, typically 
released female protesters immediately. When Dagmar Seehuber was arrested 
alongside other members of the Commune 1 for having planned the infamous 
“pudding assassination” against the U.S. vice president Hubert Humphrey (who was 
to visit West Berlin in April 1967), the officer checking her papers told her: “The 
women can all go home.” Similarly, Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz was once freed from 
prison after having been arrested at a demonstration together with Rudi. She was sent 
home with the explicit order to bring in food for her husband in his cell.47  
                                                
46 Joachim Lehmann, “Matriarchat, nicht Proletariat! Ein Rückblick auf die feminische Revolte der 
siebziger Jahre,” in Weiblichkeit als politisches Programm? Sexualität, Macht und Mythos, ed. Bettina 
Gruber, Heinz-Peter Preußer and Udo Franke-Penski (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 2005), 
40-50, here 41-45. 
47 Przytulla, nee Seehuber, qtd. in Kätzel, ed., Die 68erinnen, 207. Dutschke-Klotz qtd. ibid., 286. 
 15 
Female activists were perceived mainly as “tarts [Bräute] of the revolt” – this was 
the epithet media reporters and editors often used to belittle the women.48 Der Spiegel 
mocked the “sleep-deprived brides of the revolution” who took the pill, wore eye 
shadow and carried tampons in their purses.49 Contemporary television channels did 
not screen footage of Sander’s speech and the subsequent tomato toss from 1968, as 
the event’s significance was not recognized. Instead, much media attention centered 
on sexualized images of women in the movement. Uschi Obermaier, a model who 
temporarily joined Rainer Langhans in the Commune 1, became the pin-up of the 
revolt. She posed bare-breasted for the cover of the illustrated weekly Stern and made 
headlines with her affairs with rock musicians. Thus, the most well-known woman of 
the German student movement was anything but a feminist.50  
Unlike Uschi Obermaier, the activists who took part in the first women’s groups 
and anti-authoritarian nurseries normally shied away from the limelight. In keeping 
with the gender norms they had been socialized with, prioritizing collective needs 
over their own interests, they habitually downplayed their historical role in starting 
the second feminist movement. At a commemorative panel discussion 20 years later, 
the female protagonists confessed how uncomfortable they felt on stage. Sigrid 
Damm-Rüger, who had famously thrown the tomatoes, argued against any public 
commemoration of that event and of the feminist movement (her own daughter only 
learned about the tomato incident at her mother’s funeral in 1995). One of the co-
founders of the Frankfurt Weiberrat, Silvia Bovenschen, admitted “a strong tendency 
to flee” whenever asked to testify in public. Feminist journalist and SDS member 
Sibylle Plogstedt commented on the self-effacing manner of her fellow campaigners: 
“There never even was an attempt of the old SDS women to meet and try to work 
through our own history … The women did not formulate an interest in presenting 
their history, and the media did not show any interest in women either.”51 
                                                
48 Such as photographer Michael Ruetz. See Ingo Cornils, Writing the Revolution: The Construction of 
“1968” in Germany (Rochester: Camden House, 2016), 140. 
49 Der Spiegel, Nov. 24, 1968, 60-62. 
50 Uschi Obermaier and Olaf Kraemer, High times: mein wildes Leben (Munich: Heyne, 2008); 
Cornils, Writing the Revolution, 141-45. 
51 All qtd. in Halina Bendkowski, ed., “Antiautoritärer Anspruch und Frauenemanzipation: Die Revolte 
in der Revolte,“ Ringvorlesung 1 June 1988, transcript at 
http://www.infopartisan.net/archive/1968/29708.html (accessed March 22, 2017). Cf. Dorothee Damm, 
“Meine Mutter, die 68erin,” in Wie weit flog die Tomate? Eine 68erinnen-Gala der Reflexion, ed. 
Halina Bendkowski (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 1999), 25-29, here 25. 
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If the media largely bypassed the story of female “‘68ers,” so did mainstream 
historians. To be sure, there were books on the history of the (first and second) 
feminist movement which were written, printed and distributed within the confines of 
the feminist counter-public during the 1970s and 1980s. These niche publications 
could be astonishingly successful with female audiences. Some of these contributions 
were penned by communist or New Left feminists such as Florence Hervé or Jutta 
Menschik, whose undergraduate dissertation (Diplomarbeit) on female emancipation 
sold 32,000 copies in 1971-72 alone. Others were literary works, such as Erika 
Runge’s interview collection Frauen: Versuche zur Emanzipation which sold 66,000 
copies between 1969 and 1978, or adult education books such as Rosemarie Nave-
Herz’ Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Deutschland of which five editions were 
distributed by the Landeszentralen für politische Bildung from 1981 to 1997, every 
new edition running out of print quickly.52 From the late 1970s, influential scholarly 
works on women’s history followed.53 Through these and other publications, the 
movement armed itself with feminist ideas and became aware of the long history that 
had preceded the activism of the late 1960s. Initially, by 1968, historical literature on 
the women’s movement had still been hard to come by, as Berlin SDS member 
Sibylle Plogstedt recalled: “Books on the women’s movement, there were hardly any, 
you could carry them around with you in a small box if you were to set up a book 
table.” Even the women of the Frankfurt Weiberrat had not been aware of the nuances 
of patriarchal repression or the term sexism. Silvia Bovenschen explained, “we 
weren’t equipped particularly well … The bourgeois feminist movement was very 
repressed and forgotten … and we did not have a theory of feminism.”54 Over time, 
the diffusion of feminist ideas, taken from international and national sources, made a 
key difference.55 
                                                
52 Florence Hervé, ed., Brot und Rosen: Geschichte und Perspektiven der demokratischen 
Frauenbewegung (Frankfurt a.M.: Marxistische Blätter, 1979); F.H., Geschichte der deutschen 
Frauenbewegung (Köln: PapyRossa, 1982); Jutta Menschik, Gleichberechtigung oder Emanzipation? 
Die Frau im Erwerbsleben der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2nd ed. 1972); Erika Runge, 
Frauen: Versuche zur Emanzipation (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 7th ed. 1978); Nave-Herz, Die 
Geschichte der Frauenbewegung, 5th ed. 1997, 7. 
53 Summarized by Belinda Davis, “The Personal is Political: Gender, Politics and Political Activism in 
Modern German History,” in Gendering Modern German History, ed. Hagemann and Quataert, 107-
127. 
54 Qtd. in Bendkowski, ed., “Antiautoritärer Anspruch.” 
55 The comparison with the Soviet Union points to the key role of feminist ideas. There, women 
achieved full equality in the labour market but no feminist discourse developed. As a consequence, 
gender inequality largely persisted. See Sarah Ashwin, “Women and the Transition from Communism: 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” The Slavonic and East European Review 71 (1993): 712-16.   
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Outside the bubble of the women’s movement, historians and newspaper 
contributors largely reproduced a male narrative in their renditions of the German 
1968. Since the late 1970s, male SDS veterans had begun to spin a myth. In the press, 
they elevated themselves to a political generation which had more or less single-
handedly democratized the Federal Republic from below and broken the stranglehold 
of their Nazi fathers.56 Increasingly, the student unrest of the Sixties was now 
understood as a duel of two male age cohorts, taking up a popular pattern of 
interpretation devised by Karl Mannheim in 1928. Mannheim’s concept of political 
generations is gendered in the way it relies on educated male youth being socialized 
in war or in youth leagues and then seeking to make their mark in the political public 
sphere, battling each other intellectually. This model of generational formation is 
difficult to apply to women, whose biographies and experiences are different. 
“Political generations” are therefore automatically assumed to be masculine.57 
In the case of West Germany, much of the historiography sees a masculine 
generational conflict, overshadowed by “the crimes of the fathers,” at the heart of the 
revolt of 1968. Norbert Frei contends that the young assaulted the “silent patriarchs” 
of “the Nazi elites.” The “‘68ers”, born in the 1940s, were rootless “children of 
repression” who became estranged from their silent parents and formed a generation 
“in the spirit of their criticism of the Nazi past.” Their actions were always “a moral 
protest against the guilt of the fathers.”58 Eckart Conze likewise asserts that the young 
“were morally outraged about the older generations, about their fathers, yes their 
grandfathers” and caused “conflicts reaching right into the families.”59 “Many of the 
men and women born in Germany during the war and immediate post-war years never 
knew their fathers: who they were, what they had done,” muses Tony Judt and 
therefore explains the revolt from the clash with the fathers: “If there ever was a 
generation whose rebellion really was grounded in the rejection of everything their 
parents represented – everything: national pride, Nazism, money, the West, peace, 
                                                
56 Axel Schildt speaks of a generation deriving its identity from the press [“Generation am Tropf des 
Feuilletons”]. “Überbewertet? Zur Macht objektiver Entwicklungen und zur Wirkungslosigkeit der 
‚68er’,” in Reform und Revolte: politischer und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik vor 
und nach 1968, ed. Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), pp. 89-102, here 93. 
57 Christina Benninghaus, “Das Geschlecht der Generation: Zum Zusammenhang von Generationalität 
und Männlichkeit um 1930,” in Generationen: Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffs, 
ed. Ulrike Jureit and Michael Wildt (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 127-58. See also Ulrike 
Jureit, Generationenforschung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2006). 
58 Frei, 1968, 78-80, 84, 87, 222. 
59 Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit, 337. 
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stability, law and democracy – it was ‘Hitler’s children,’ the West German radicals of 
the Sixties.”60 Often, a socio-psychological argument is employed. The inter-
generational conflicts allegedly escalated because of the parents’ emotional coldness 
and inability to talk about the past. “The price to be paid ... was the generational 
rebellion of ‘1968.’ The radicalism exhibited then was the result of the psychological 
damage caused by the intergenerational transfer of the psychological legacy of 
Nazism.”61 The “‘68ers” were “a generation of emotionally freezing children” whose 
“key problem” was “a lack of nest warmth.”62  
To substantiate such claims, historians often turn to autobiographies and literary 
texts by well-known male protesters, such as Bernward Vesper (son of Nazi poet Will 
Vesper and husband of terrorist Gudrun Ensslin), K.D. Wolff (chairman of the West 
German SDS in 1968), and Hannes Heer (head of Bonn’s SDS and later a leading 
member of the Wehrmacht exhibition team). Vesper, Wolff and Heer publicly 
maintained they had turned into rebels because of their Nazi fathers’ refusal to talk 
about their past.63 Through extensive media coverage, these isolated cases over time 
morphed into a generalized generational narrative. “‘68ers” who were interviewed 
decades after the fact typically resorted to the trope of falling out with their fathers 
who were described as having been fellow travellers or perpetrators. A few historians 
took this generational narrative of the “‘68ers” at face value, basing their argument on 
uncritical analysis of oral history sources.64 But it has been established that in fact, 
most left-wing protesters “did not come from families with a right-wing or 
particularly conservative outlook.” A team which conducted nearly 500 interviews 
with former activists across Europe between 2007 and 2011 concluded: “However 
firmly the notion of generational conflict may be established in popular memory, 
many activists – in Germany and elsewhere – did not experience such a political 
                                                
60 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London: William Heinemann, 2005), 417. See 
also Hartmut Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 2007), 34; 
Wienhaus, Bildungswege zu 1968, 38-42. 
61 A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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62 Aly, Unser Kampf, 196, 189. 
63 See the 1977 novel by Bernward Vesper, Die Reise (Erfstadt: Area, 2005). For Wolff, see Piotr 
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conflict within their own families.”65 The “‘68ers” only staged the genealogical clash, 
argues Ulrike Jureit: Long after the fact, and in marked contrast to historical reality, 
they constructed topoi such as emotionally cold parents and the “Auschwitz shock” to 
allow for a heroic generational narrative.66 The same case was made for the Italian 
“‘68ers” who, according to ex-activist and historian Luisa Passerini, “chose to be 
orphans” by overemphasizing generational tensions in their family.67 
Such “late oedipal scenarios” of paternal repression, to quote Claus Leggewie,68 
were also widespread in fictional literature. Since the early 1970s, the new genre of 
Väterliteratur explored the traumatic consequences this type of conflict left on the 
young generation in West Germany. It was mainly young male authors who bewailed 
the silence, the guilt, but also the traumatic loss of their Nazi fathers in novels and 
plays.69 This genre reprises old literary tropes going back centuries.70  
There are several problems with this Don Carlos myth. It understands the young 
as active and the old as passive. It takes for granted that the Nazi past was at the core 
of generational conflict. It wrongly implies that generational conflict was a 
widespread reality in the families of the Sixties. It also tends to resort to collective 
psychology and to conflate political generations with familial generations. I have 
shown elsewhere that it was common for “‘68ers” to join in the selective silence with 
which the Nazi past was treated in West German families. Intergenerational conflict 
within Sixties families was less frequent and less virulent than often assumed, and it 
was not normally tied to Nazi legacies.71 Here, I will concentrate on the gender aspect 
of the myth. The generational version of events, obsessed as it is with fathers, 
disregards female experience and agency. It also leads to an overemphasis on 
generational conflict in the historical narrative, thereby underrepresenting the 
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virulence of gender conflict within the younger age cohort and leaving relations 
between daughters and parents underexplored. 
For if we investigate relations between mothers and daughters in Sixties families – 
a topic which needs more research –, all indications point to arrangements that mostly 
avoided open conflict and at times included mutual support in conflicts with fathers 
and grandfathers. While the mothers were no longer role models whose life scripts 
could easily be copied, many remained close confidantes. In contemporary polls, a 
third of 23-year-old women named their mothers as the go-to-person they trusted 
most, and another fifth named both parents. Four out of five young people described 
their mothers as “approachable” and “emotionally positive.” The percentage was 
highest in academic, white-collar and civil servant families.72 These findings 
contradict today’s stereotype of “Hitler’s willing mothers” (Sabine Bode) who 
allegedly ruled over their 68er offspring as cold and heartless disciplinarians, 
traumatizing them in the process.73 During the summer of 1968, psychologists 
interviewed 39 mothers between 35 and 56 years of age in the Cologne-Bonn region. 
Most mothers saw their teenage or adult daughters as partners: They mutually 
negotiated many everyday decisions, from miniskirts to parties, and crucially helped 
them attain higher education and choose their vocation freely. Often, mothers who felt 
that their own educational chances and career options had been stymied helped their 
daughters to achieve the high school leaving certificate (Abitur) and even go to 
university, against the reservations of fathers.74  
Still, many female “‘68ers” mainly conceived of their mothers as depressed 
housewives who were dominated by their husbands. Mechtild Düsing, then a student 
in Münster, stated: “We no longer wanted to be like our own mothers who had only 
lived for the man ... The own mother, that was the horror image!”75 Like Helke 
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Sander of the Berlin Aktionsrat who called the mothers “eerily ... subservient,” many 
feminist activists criticized the ritualized humility and apolitical stance of older 
women. “Doing it differently from your mother” became a rallying cry with which 
young feminists publicly vowed to no longer be dominated by marriage and family. 
For example, the author Erika Runge (born 1939) embarked on her successful 
interview project with life histories of 17 German women because “I needed role 
models. My mother couldn’t be one for me, I didn’t want to live like her.”76 In public, 
therefore, the female “‘68ers” delineated themselves clearly from their mothers, 
whom they characterized as apolitical, submissive, de-personalized housewives (but 
not as Nazis). However, a closer look at the biographies of mothers and daughters 
shows that in reality, change was more gradual than radical. Women who were born 
around 1940 tended to live a phased life model in which periods of employment came 
before and after child-rearing – just like their mothers. But the younger generation 
was better at theorizing and publicly defending their career phases as motivated by 
individual choices. In contrast, the mothers often veiled periods of paid employment 
as necessary contributions to the family collective – because they did not want to 
challenge the traditional marriage model.77 Overall, most middle-aged women of the 
Sixties were somewhat less patriarchally minded than the grandmothers’ generation 
and maintained close relationships with their daughters. In private, then, generational 
conflict between female “‘68ers” and their mothers was much less pronounced than in 
public statements, with the mothers’ or grandmothers’ Nazi past hardly ever being 
addressed. 
 Although our picture of the relationship between mothers and daughters is still 
sketchy,78 the addition of gender changes the established narrative of “1968.” Within 
families and in the private sphere, gender conflict seems to have been at least as 
prominent, and possibly more so, than generational conflict. This has repercussions 
for our understanding of what the Sixties protest movement achieved in the long term, 
and what defines the political generation of the “‘68ers.” 
 The generational belonging of male and female “‘68ers” was defined in 
different ways. Many men who were born in the 1940s and early 1950s began to feel 
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a part of this generation when, years after the events, they actively or passively took 
part in mass media debates about the role of their age cohort in the history of the 
republic. Female “‘68ers” did not communicate to the same extent in public about 
their historical role and biographic commonalities. What bound these women 
together, beyond having been born in the same decade, was not the “narrated 
generational experience” but “silent” generational experiences: direct, life-changing 
experiences such as the contraceptive pill (as argued by Eva Maria Silies79), women’s 
groups, or battles with male partners over chores, childcare and career choices. This 
concept of a “silent” generation differs from the established Mannheimian pattern of 
political generations in several ways. It allows for formative experiences in the private 
sphere, it is not restricted to the educated elites, and is not as dependent on mediated 
discourses. These features enable us to extend the concept to include women, and thus 
to define the “‘68ers” as a generation of both genders.  
 It has almost become a truism among historians that the protest movement 
“failed politically but succeeded culturally”80 – that it could not incite a socialist 
revolution, but set into motion a lifestyle revolution which over the long term changed 
the republic beyond recognition. In concluding his account of the Sixties, for 
example, Norbert Frei argues that a sea change of “the face and the mentality of the 
republic” was the protesters’ lasting achievement. In Frei’s words, “From now on, it 
was not exactly ubiquitous but certainly possible to witness in a Swabian village a 
skilled worker with slightly longer hair pushing along a pram, his female partner not 
being present – and likewise a young female secretary from a Hessian town 
holidaying in Spain on her own.” Frei’s examples are taken from the private sphere 
and are about “doing gender:” about the myriad ways in which men and women 
express and negotiate their gender identities. Nevertheless, Frei’s book devotes very 
little space to gender conflict and negotiation.81 If we subscribe to the argument of 
political failure and cultural success, we should acknowledge that “cultural” in this 
instance largely means “gendered,” and that it is the female “‘68ers” who should 
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mainly be credited with bringing about this lifestyle revolution. If the most 
fundamental consequences of the Sixties revolt were changes to the way West 
Germans “did gender,” then it was, for the most part, the female long march through 
the marriages and families of the republic which brought about change. It was the 
anti-patriarchal thrust of the protest movement that formed its essential legacy; it 
chimed well with the movement’s overarching anti-authoritarianism. 
 When we widen our perspective beyond Germany, we can detect the first 
stirrings of a gender-aware reassessment of the history of Sixties. Looking at North 
and Latin America, Japan and Western Europe, Sara M. Evans has recently argued 
that “gender insurgency was a central component of the rebellions of men as well as 
women across the globe.” She, too, stresses “that feminism and dramatic challenges to 
gender relations were among the primary legacies of the activism of the ‘1968 
generation,’” even if most historiography still gives “short shrift to women.” The 
journal L’Homme also ran a special issue highlighting the absence of the category 
gender in the scholarship on “1968” in the Dutch, Austrian, Swiss, German and 
Eastern European settings.82 And historians of the French May have begun to attack 
the way the events have been reduced to a Parisian story of educated, leftist elites, 
bypassing the workers, the masses and the provinces (but without primarily focusing 
on gender).83  
 It seems that a re-assessment of the historical importance of post-war female 
activism is on the international agenda. But the fiftieth anniversary of “1968” has led 
to contentious discussion in Germany. Responding to my book which highlights the 
role of women in the late 1960s, historians Wolfgang Kraushaar and Axel Schildt 
deny that the West German second feminist movement was sparked in 1968. 
Kraushaar concedes that “the female side was underexposed in historiography to 
date” but attacks what he sees as an attempt to rewrite the student movement as “a 
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female students” movement [‘Studentinnenbewegung’]. He argues: “The new 
women’s movement only formed in 1971 in the context of the anti-abortion campaign 
... Beforehand, there were only tiny groups and circles, but no movement in the true 
sense of the word [im eigentlichen Sinne].” Schildt similarly acknowledges that 
“there was doubtless a marginalization of the female part of the revolt in public 
perception,” but criticizes “the backdating of the genesis of a new women’s 
movement” and the inclusion of “the SDS-heroines’ ‘tomato tosses’ which have 
already been cited to death.”84 In trying to shift the women’s movement into the 
1970s, and therefore to keep “1968” assigned to male protagonists, Kraushaar and 
Schildt unintentionally reproduce the view of contemporary male New Leftists who 
saw women’s struggle for equality as the “minor contradiction.” They also reprise 
Alice Schwarzer’s version of history. Schwarzer maintains that the second feminist 
movement began only with the 1971 anti-abortion campaign which she herself had 
initiated as a young journalist. For her, the late 1960s women’s groups were but a 
“deceptive illusion [trügerischer Schein]” and “premature spring [Vorfrühling] of the 
women’s movement” as they allegedly never left the “student ghetto.”85 It is true that 
during the 1970s, the West German feminist movement grew massively and became 
less socially exclusive and heteronormative. Its public protests and media coverage 
multiplied, and it added a new emphasis on women’s bodily and sexual autonomy. 
Nevertheless, in 1968 the key elements of the second wave of the women’s movement 
were already present. Female “‘68ers” found their voice as political actors; they 
practiced the protest forms of symbolic and direct action; they argued that the private 
was political; they organized in informal, gender-separatist groups; they founded anti-
authoritarian nurseries. There are also significant personal continuities between the 
female activism of 1968 and the 1970s. For example, Helke Sander whose speech had 
enraged SDS machos in 1968 was active in the Berlin women’s group Brot und Rosen 
and the campaign against the pill during the 1970s. Sarah Haffner reappeared in 1976 
when she initiated the first safe house for battered women (in Berlin). Several women 
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from early Berlin women’s groups participated in the first salvo of Schwarzer’s anti-
abortion campaign in the weekly Stern in 1971 where they confessed, “I had an 
abortion.”86 Why put up a fence between “1968” and the women’s movement of the 
1970s? 
The example of “1968” shows that historians could integrate female agency 
into the master narratives of contemporary history in many ways. Publications in post-
1945 women’s and gender history are too often considered “niche” and need to play a 
greater role in master surveys. Areas with “feminine” connotations deserve more 
attention by mainstream historians, particularly conflicts and changes in the private 
sphere and the family, which were entwined with politics and wider society. 
Historians could also focus more intently on “doing gender” and how it changed over 
time. They could resist buying into contemporary gendered dichotomies such as a 
feminized “cultural” versus a masculine “political” realm – recognizing that changes 
in the so-called cultural sphere were often political and impactful. The tendency to 
narrate contemporary history as a duel of political generations (of ‘45ers’ and ‘68ers’, 
possibly with ‘33ers’ added in87) needs to be recognized as an inherently male 
perspective. In addition, we lack studies on middle-aged and elderly women, 
conservative and Christian women as well as working-class women; these groups are 
largely invisible in contemporary historiography.88 Furthermore, the Federal 
Republic’s commemorative culture appears gendered, privileging male recollections. 
Local and regional oral history projects and exhibitions need to represent women’s 
voices and women’s activism alongside men’s more fully. So far, interview 
collections and exhibition catalogues on late Sixties protest underrepresent women, 
and rarely ask their subjects about clashes and negotiations over gender. Typical 
examples are a Bonn and a Berlin project carried out for the fortieth anniversary of 
“1968.”89  
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Lastly, master narratives of the Federal Republic that measure success against 
ideals of Western democracy could rethink how the struggle against patriarchal 
structures and gender inequality relates to their overarching argument. To what extent 
did post-war processes of “Westernization” and “liberalization” rely on, advance or 
reduce male domination? How does the emancipation of women, as a century-long, 
continuous but uneven process peaking between roughly 1968 and the early 1980s, 
impact the periodization of post-1945 West German history? So far, the long Sixties, 
spanning from the last third of the 1950s to about 1973, have often figured as a 
decade of dynamic change, experimentation crisis and grass-roots democratization 
during which the face of the republic was transformed. The Seventies that followed 
have been framed as an era of structural rupture, when economy, labor, science and 
intellectual debates adjusted to new conditions “after the boom.” Both the debates 
about the character of the long Sixties and the era “after the boom” could benefit from 
a more meaningful inclusion of patriarchal continuities and feminist agency in 
twentieth-century history.90 We need to overcome the compartmentalization of 
women’s and gender history in writing the story of the Federal Republic. Only then 
can we assess its “success” and its relationship to the West more fully. 
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